On Indian Children and the Fifth Amendment by Fletcher, Matthew L.M.
Montana Law Review
Volume 80
Issue 1 Winter 2019 Article 5
5-15-2019
On Indian Children and the Fifth Amendment
Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Panelist, Professor of Law & Director of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center at Michigan State University College of Law,
matthew.fletcher@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, On Indian Children and the Fifth Amendment, 80 Mont. L. Rev. 99 (2019).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON106.txt unknown Seq: 1 15-MAY-19 9:45
ESSAY
ON INDIAN CHILDREN AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Matthew L.M. Fletcher*
I. A TALE OF TWO ANISHINAABE FAMILIES
Many of my first memories revolve around my grandmother Laura
Mamagona’s apartment in Grand Rapids, Michigan. She shared the apart-
ment with my uncle Crockett, who was a college student. Her apartment
was the upstairs room of an old house on the side of a hill on College Street.
My memories are mostly of domestic activities. Cooking. Sweeping. Sitting
around. Playing with trains. Leafing through Crockett’s Sports Illustrated
magazine collection. Laura worked the night shift at the veteran’s hospital
across from Riverside Park. Early on weekday mornings, June, my mother,
would drop me off at Laura’s place in her VW bug, the first car I remember.
I had my own crib at Laura’s, one I can remember escaping pretty easily.
Often, Laura would sleep most of the morning while I puttered around the
house. Sometimes, Crockett would be there. Family lore tells that once,
June dropped me off earlier than usual and Laura had worked a little late, so
I was probably there alone for a short while. I heard the story so often
growing up that I can seemingly remember that day, too. This was in the
mid-1970s, before Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act.1
Recently, my wife Wenona Singel discovered documents about
Laura’s childhood home life in the National Archives in Chicago. Wenona
* Professor of Law & Director of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center at Michigan State Uni-
versity College of Law. Miigwetch to Greg Ablavsky, Barbara Creel, Kate Fort, Diane Humetewa,
Anthony Johnstone, Monte Mills, Frank Pommersheim, Angela Riley, Neoshia Roemer, Wenona Singel,
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rest of the Montana Law Review editors.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978).
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was there to research family boarding school histories. Laura’s name as a
young woman, Laura Stevens, was listed alongside several of her brothers
and sisters as former students at Mount Pleasant Indian Industrial Boarding
School. They were all born with the Pokagon surname, but Laura’s dad,
Peter Stevens, changed their names, thinking it would help the family blend
in with white America. Laura never attended the boarding school, and in-
stead spent those years in quarantine in a hospital in Kalamazoo. We think
she tested positive for tuberculosis at the boarding school intake and was
diverted to quarantine. While Laura was there in the hospital during several
of her early teen years, her biological mother walked on. Laura had younger
brothers and sisters in her family home in Allegan County, Michigan. So,
Peter—who was single then—drove to Kalamazoo and took Laura home.
As a young woman, but the oldest sibling left in the house, Laura was
forced to replace her mom. The archive documents contain reports by social
workers who visited the house, we think, on somewhat random occasions.
They were spot checks, of sorts, by the State of Michigan, to see how this
Indian family with no mother in the home was coming along.
The social workers detailed every aspect of the Stevens’ home in the
reports. They noted how many Bibles were in the house and where they
were placed. They noted how many portraits of Jesus Christ there were and
the location each was hung. They reported Laura’s younger siblings were
all dressed for company and quietly studying. They focused especially on
teenaged Laura. There she was, sweeping the kitchen. There she was, cook-
ing dinner. There she was, folding clothes. The social workers were im-
pressed. Well, they were barely impressed. Laura was, after all, still an In-
dian. Reading the reports, one can’t help but think that young Laura Stevens
was the only thing stopping the State from taking Peter Stevens’s kids away
from him. Imagine if she had been out shopping on the day of the spot visit.
The little Stevens kids would have been home alone, dishes in the sink and
dirty clothes on the floor. Laura might have come home from shopping, and
then later Peter from work, to find a home stripped of its children. How-
ever, this never came to be. Perhaps out of sheer luck, Laura was always
home when the social workers showed up.
Laura walked on in 2001, but her relations (and mine) are enrolled
with Michigan Indian tribes such as the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indi-
ans (Pokagon) and the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians (Gun Lake). Some of us are enrolled with the Grand Traverse Band
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (GTB), our enrollment deriving from my
grandfather David Mamagona’s line and other relatives on Laura’s side.
The federal government did not recognize those tribes back when Laura
2
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was young. GTB was recognized in 1980,2 Pokagon in 1994,3 and Gun
Lake in 1998.4
Federal recognition means that a tribe is eligible to receive services
from the United States.5 Most tribes administer their own services in an
arrangement rooted in self-determination where Congress appropriates
funds to tribes, with the tribes acting as their own service providers.6 In
other words, the tribes are government contractors. Tribes spend federal
money, commingled with their own funds, to provide health care, housing,
social services, public safety, education, and other services.
Federal recognition also means that a tribe is eligible to take advantage
of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.7 All three of these tribes participate
in gaming activities on their lands. In 1984, GTB was one of the first tribes
in the nation to operate a reasonably successful gaming operation.8 Pokagon
and Gun Lake were forced to litigate for many years before they could
break ground on their gaming operations.9 Gun Lake was dragged to the
Supreme Court twice.10 But now, all three tribes generate governmental
revenue to fund tribal services from their gaming operations.
Indian people of these tribes, including my relations, have moved from
abject poverty to lower middle class, in large part because of federal recog-
nition. My mother, June Mamagona Fletcher, retired a few years ago. As a
tribal citizen, she is eligible for health care services from her tribe, Gun
Lake. All of her cousins, most of whom are of retirement age, finally have
some semblance of stability. They have health care from the tribes. They
have income assistance from tribal per capita payments. Laura’s generation
didn’t have these benefits, and even my mother’s generation didn’t have
them until they reached middle age or later.
I shudder to think about what would have happened to Laura’s siblings
had she not been there one day when the state social workers showed up.
There was a good chance the State would have declared Peter Stevens to be
2. Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chip-
pewa Indians as an Indian Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321, 19,321–22 (Mar. 25, 1980).
3. An Act to Restore Federal Services to the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, Pub. L. No.
103-323, § 2, 108 Stat. 2152, 2153 (1994).
4. Final Determination to Acknowledge the Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomi Indi-
ans of Michigan, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,936, 56,936–38 (Oct. 23, 1998).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990); What is a Federally Recognized Tribe?, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://perma.cc/JA7S-78HC.
6. 25 U.S.C. § 5301; Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, EXEC. OR-
DER NO. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249–52 (Nov. 9, 2000).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988).
8. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE GRAND TRAV-
ERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA 168 (2012).
9. Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Pokagon).
10. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018) (Gun Lake); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012).
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an unfit father and taken his youngest children away. We know from the
legislative history of the Indian Child Welfare Act11 that approximately
one-quarter to one-third of all Indian children were taken from their homes
in the middle decades of the twentieth century.12
Laura and her younger siblings were lucky, sort of. Mount Pleasant
Indian boarding school closed in 1934.13 They narrowly avoided removal
by the State. But they would be forced to wait another half-century and
more before GTB, Pokagon, and Gun Lake would finally be federally rec-
ognized.
My wife’s family was not so lucky. Wenona’s people are from north-
ern lower Michigan. She is a citizen of the Little Traverse Bay Bands of
Odawa Indians (LTBB), and a descendant of the Little River Band of Ot-
tawa Indians (LRB), the Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians,
and the Grand River Band of Ottawa Indians. LTBB and LRB were feder-
ally recognized the same day that Congress recognized Pokagon Band in
1994.14 But Burt Lake and Grand River still are not, despite being signato-
ries to ratified treaties with the United States.15
The State of Michigan removed Wenona’s mother and all her aunts
and uncles from their parents Hank and Lorraine Shananaquet, who lived in
Emmet County, back in the 1950s.16 These Indian children were dispersed
to non-Indian families around the country. Wenona’s mother, my mother in
law, Loretta, and her sister were placed with a non-Indian family in Detroit
by Catholic Social Services.
When Wenona was four, her two-year-old sister Christina was taken
by church officials in southeast Michigan and marketed to a non-Indian
couple for adoption.17 Wenona’s earliest memories are not like mine of
bland domestic bliss, but instead she remembers missing Christina. Her
memories are of pain, of not understanding why the most important person
in her life was suddenly gone. Wenona eventually located her sister, who
11. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978).
12. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32–33 (1989) (citing Indian Child
Welfare Act: Problems that American Indian Families Face in Raising their Children and How These
Problems are Affected by Federal Action or Inaction: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 3 (1974) (statement of William Byler,
Exec. Dir., Ass’n on Am. Indian Affairs)).
13. GEORGE CORNELL, THE OJIBWAY, IN PEOPLE OF THE THREE FIRES: THE OTTAWA, POTAWATOMI,
AND OJIBWAY OF MICHIGAN 75, 100 (1986).
14. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-324, §4(a), 108 Stat. 2153, 2157 (1994).
15. Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Zinke, 217 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (D.D.C.
2002); Grand River Band of Ottawa Indians Disposition of Judgment Funds, S. Rep. 94-577, at 2
(1975).
16. Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Indian Children and the Federal-Tribal Trust
Relationship, 95 NEB. L. REV. 885, 887 (2017).
17. Id.
4
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was living in Columbus, Ohio, where she grew up with the adoptive family.
Wenona’s sister is not enrolled at LTBB, even though she is eligible. Ac-
cordingly, tribal services are not available to her. She isn’t part of the tribal
community here in Michigan. She is a lost bird.
Wenona and I didn’t know each other growing up. I grew up in Alle-
gan County. She grew up in Wayne County. We went to college and law
school in different states. We came together because we shared a client, the
Grand Traverse Band, that was involved in gaming-related litigation in fed-
eral court.18 We eventually married and became parents. We have two boys,
Owen and Emmett. After Owen was born, we knew that he was eligible for
citizenship with as many as 6 of the 12 federally recognized tribes in Michi-
gan. We joked that if we had enough kids, we could enroll them throughout
Michigan and attend tribal membership meetings all year around. For one
year we thought about where to enroll Owen. We eventually settled on
GTB, my tribe. Some days we regret our decision, and some day Owen or
his brother Emmett might try to change their enrollment. But it was a
choice we made as parents. A political choice.
In Brackeen v. Zinke,19 a federal judge held that federal laws like the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) that benefit Indian people who are not
tribal citizens but merely eligible for enrollment, must be held to a strict
scrutiny analysis under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment.20 This holding means that prior to their formal enrollment with GTB,
any government services that GTB or the federal government provided to
Owen and Emmett because of their relationship to their tribal citizen par-
ents or their eligibility for citizenship at GTB and other tribes, are probably
unconstitutional. The court held that ICWA, a statute that applies to all
Indian children who are tribal citizens or eligible for enrollment with a fed-
erally recognized tribe, created legal classifications based on race, which
triggered strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.21 Until this decision, the courts
had held that when a federal statute creates legal standards for Indians, Con-
gress is acting in accordance with its political relationship with Indian
tribes, irrespective of race.22 The court nevertheless concluded that any fed-
eral statute that establishes legal standards for Indian children who are not
citizens of federally recognized tribes creates a classification based purely
18. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Att’y for W. Dist. of
Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff’d, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004).
19. Order Partially Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Brackeen v. Zinke, 2018
WL 4927908 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018) (No. 4:17-CV-00868-O).
20. Id. at *13–14.
21. Id. at *12.
22. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974).
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on race.23 And because ICWA applies to tribal members and non-enrolled
persons eligible for membership, the court decided the entire statute was
unconstitutional.24
II. MY PLSI FIFTH AMENDMENT CLASS
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a truly fate-
ful provision for Indian people. On occasion, Wenona and I teach at the
Pre-Law Summer Institute (PLSI) for American Indians.25 It’s an eight-
week program that serves a little bit like a summer boot camp for Indian
people who are planning to matriculate to law schools in the fall. Wenona
teaches Property and I teach Indian Law. Compared with the regular law
school survey-the-field course in Federal Indian Law, the short class I teach
at PLSI is even more truncated. I can only assign a cross-section of the
“greatest hits” of Indian law Supreme Court decisions because I don’t have
time to conduct a full survey. I also try to assign cases where tribal interests
prevailed. It turns out tribal interests and Indian people prevail more than
not when the Fifth Amendment is in play. However, there are cases where
tribal interests painfully and dramatically suffer under the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.
Here is the Fifth Amendment:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.26
Early in PLSI, I teach Talton v. Mayes,27 an 1896 case where a Chero-
kee man sentenced to death for capital murder by the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma brought a habeas claim rooted in the Fifth Amendment to the
Supreme Court.28 The Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury, and Con-
gress had determined that a grand jury must consist of more than six per-
sons.29 According to Talton, the man on death row, the Cherokee grand jury
23. Order Partially Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at *12, Brackeen v. Zinke,
2018 WL 4927908 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018) (No. 4:17-CV-00868-O).
24. Id. at *13.
25. Jordan Oglesby, Pipeline to Tribal Sovereignty: Celebrating the Pre-Law Summer Institute’s
50th Class, INDIAN LAW TIMES: STATE BAR OF NEW MEXICO INDIAN LAW SECTION, Fall 2018, at 6,
https://perma.cc/JQ89-K3UV.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
28. Id. at 376–77.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Talton, 163 U.S. at 378.
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss1/5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON106.txt unknown Seq: 7 15-MAY-19 9:45
2019 ON INDIAN CHILDREN 105
consisted of only five persons, and therefore violated federal law.30 The
Supreme Court rejected the argument and affirmed the capital conviction.31
According to the Court, there was no Fifth Amendment grand jury require-
ment for the Cherokee Nation to follow, because the Constitution is inappli-
cable to tribal governments.32
A little later on, I teach United States v. Wheeler,33 where a Navajo
man sentenced to a lengthy federal prison sentence for statutory rape under
federal law argued to the Supreme Court that the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause barred the prosecution.34 Wheeler had already pled
guilty to statutory rape in the courts of the Navajo Nation and challenged
the subsequent federal prosecution under the Fifth Amendment.35 The Su-
preme Court rejected the claim because (remember Talton v. Mayes) the
Constitution is not applicable to Indian tribes.36 Therefore, the Court rea-
soned, a tribal conviction is not rooted in the Constitution.37 Wheeler fur-
ther argued that it wasn’t so simple: The Navajo Nation is an arm of the
federal government because the United States (remember self-determina-
tion?) funds the Navajo tribal justice system, at least in part.38 Therefore,
for Wheeler, the subsequent federal prosecution was actually the second
time the United States had prosecuted him for the same crime.39 The Court
rejected that argument too, explaining that Indian tribes are separate sover-
eigns possessing inherent powers not derived from the Constitution.40 Tri-
bal sovereignty and federal sovereignty are derived from different
sources.41 Applying this rationale, when a person punches a tribal police
officer cross-deputized by the federal and state governments, that person is
punching all three sovereigns, and can be prosecuted by all three under the
Fifth Amendment.
I also teach Morton v. Mancari,42 which is one of the most famous
Indian law decisions and constitutes the foundation of much of federal In-
dian affairs laws. Mancari was a non-Indian grade school teacher employed
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the 1970s.43 In 1934, Congress
30. Talton, 163 U.S. at 379.
31. Id. at 385.
32. Id. at 381–84.
33. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
34. Id. at 316.
35. Id. at 315–16.
36. Id. at 329–30.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 319–20.
39. Id. at 315–16.
40. Id. at 321–24.
41. Id. at 327–28.
42. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
43. Id. at 539.
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required the BIA to enact Indian preference in employment regulations.44
The idea was that since the BIA was the primary agency administering In-
dian affairs programs, a significant number of people who worked for the
BIA should also be Indians.45 Prior to 1934, few Indians worked for the
BIA. By the 1970s, way more Indians worked for the BIA and other Indian
affairs offices, most notably the Indian Health Service, which Congress also
required to adopt Indian preference regulations.46 The claim in Mancari
arose when an Indian was hired over a non-Indian. The non-Indian person
brought a suit which claimed the Indian preference regulations violated the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.47
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Amendment claim.48 The Court
concluded that when Congress is acting in accordance with its trust respon-
sibility to Indians and Indian tribes, it is not acting on the basis of race.49
Instead, Congress is acting in accordance with its political obligations to
Indian tribes, who are domestic sovereigns acknowledged in the Commerce
Clause50 alongside foreign nations and states as governmental entities.51 In-
dian tribes are entities with which the United States has a long and deep
treaty relationship.52 The President doesn’t negotiate treaties with states or
corporations or the Boy Scouts, but does (or did) negotiate with Indian
tribes. In those treaties, the United States promised to undertake a duty of
protection to Indians and tribes.53 That treaty relationship is a purely politi-
cal relationship.54 As the Court announced in Mancari, the Indian prefer-
ence requirement wasn’t a racial preference, it was a political preference.
Indian preference is a tool to create a bureaucracy best suited to administer-
ing the federal government’s duty of protection. It is not a racial giveaway.
The Fifth Amendment is not always the friend of Indian people and
Indian tribes. In the PLSI class, after Mancari, I jump backward in chronol-
ogy to discuss Lone Wolf, decided in 1903, and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States,55 decided in 1955. In Lone Wolf, the federal government
planned to confiscate Indian reservation lands guaranteed by treaty and allot
the lands out to individual Indians (and later, non-Indians) parcel-by-par-
44. Id. at 537–38.
45. Id. at 541–43.
46. Id. at 545.
47. Id. at 539.
48. Id. at 554–55.
49. Id. at 553–55.
50. Id. at 551–52.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
53. Morton, 417 U.S. at 552.
54. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903).
55. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
8
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cel.56 The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Amendment takings argument
made by the tribal citizens that objected to this process, reasoning that while
the reservation land was arguably a vested property interest, individual Indi-
ans were compensated adequately because they would receive an allotment
of land.57 It mattered little to the Court that the Indians didn’t want the
allotments and preferred the reservation lands, or that individual Indians
likely would not receive much more than pennies on the dollar in actual
compensation. For the Court, Indian affairs matters were political questions,
and the Court was loathe to interfere.
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Department of the Interior had confiscated lands in
Alaska, and from those lands later established the Tongass National Forest
from the aboriginal homelands of the Tlingit people.58 The Alaskan Native
nations never ceded the land to the United States by treaty, and Congress
never compensated the tribes for the taking of their aboriginal title.59 In
prior similar circumstances, Congress did on occasion allow Alaska Native
nations to sue in the federal claims courts for the taking of aboriginal prop-
erty interests.60 The same line up of justices that decided Brown v. Board of
Education61 (minus three dissenters) held that the federal government’s tak-
ing of aboriginal property interests, also known as aboriginal title, was not a
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.62 In short, the only way
for Indian people and Indian tribes to bring a valid property rights taking
claim against the federal government was if the federal government recog-
nized the title.
I place these early cases later in the semester for the PLSI students so
that I don’t hit them so hard with such terrible decisions and demoralize
them. Lone Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton are part of the dark side of the federal
government’s duty of protection—if the government chose not to recognize
Indian property interests, or chose not to adequately compensate them for
property takings, then there was little Indian people could do about it.
A few years later, the Supreme Court decided another case with Fifth
Amendment implications that pushed back on the Tee-Hit-Ton decision:
Menominee Tribe v. United States.63 In that case, Congress had terminated
56. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554–55.
57. Id. at 568.
58. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 266–67 (explaining that in 1951, the Secretary of Agriculture
“contracted for sale to a private company of all merchantable timber in the area claimed by [the Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians],” which the Tribe “allege[d] constitute[d] a compensable taking by the United States of a
portion of its proprietary interest in the land.”).
59. Id. at 277.
60. Id. at 282.
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 285.
63. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
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its trust relationship with the Menominee Tribe, leading the State of Wis-
consin to conclude that the tribe’s treaty rights had been abrogated.64 That
caused the tribe to sue the United States in the federal claims court for the
taking of its vested property rights to hunt and fish in accordance with its
treaty.65 When the case proceeded to the Supreme Court, the United States
switched its position to avoid the taking claim by arguing that the termina-
tion of the tribe did not affect an abrogation of the treaty rights.66 The Court
did not directly address the question of whether the taking of a treaty right
is compensable under the Fifth Amendment, but the federal government’s
implicit admission that it was, by switching its legal position to avoid the
question, is compelling.67
I usually teach United States v. Sioux Nation68 at PLSI too, but not
always. Sioux Nation, decided in 1980, undid much of the damage of Lone
Wolf to the status of tribal property interests.69 There, the tribe won a large
monetary award from the United States for the taking of the Black Hills
without tribal consent or just compensation.70 The government attempted to
defeat the claim under the Lone Wolf precedent, demanding the deference
on Indian property takings and compensation matters that Lone Wolf af-
forded the government.71 However, the Court was not so impressed when
the government admitted that the only compensation offered the Sioux Na-
tion for the taking of the Black Hills was a few years of rations, that is,
rancid meat.72 The Sioux Nation majority rejected the government’s de-
mand for deference.73
These cases constitute a decent survey of most of the jurisprudence
arising from the Fifth Amendment—grand juries, double jeopardy, due pro-
cess, and just compensation. The only big issue missing is the right against
self-incrimination. It’s remarkable that a single constitutional provision
contains within it the fount of so many civil and criminal rights matters.
The most recent Indian law decision involving Fifth Amendment prin-
ciples is United States v. Lara,74 decided in 2004. Lara may one day be
heralded as the beginning of a sea change in federal Indian law. Or not.
There, the Supreme Court reconfirmed the Wheeler holding applying the
64. Id. at 407.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 411.
67. Id.
68. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
69. Id. at 423–24.
70. Id. at 424.
71. Id. at 409–10.
72. Id. at 417–19.
73. Id. at 414.
74. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
10
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dual sovereignty exception to the prohibition on two prosecutions for the
same offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause.75 The Lara matter arose
from an act of Congress76 that was intended to undo a Supreme Court deci-
sion from 1990, Duro v. Reina77—hence, the Duro fix.78 In Duro, the Court
held that Indian tribes did not possess inherent sovereign authority to prose-
cute nonmembers.79 In a previous case, the Court had held that Congress
could authorize tribes to do so.80 So, Congress did exactly that.
The Duro fix was a kind of constitutional anomaly. In its report, Con-
gress specifically stated that Duro was incorrectly decided by the Supreme
Court, and it intended to reverse the Court.81 Normally when Congress
overrules a Supreme Court precedent, it only has power to fix what it deems
incorrect interpretations of federal statutes.82 Congress does not have the
power to correct the Court on interpretations of the Constitution, at least not
since Marbury v. Madison.83
But what if there is no interpretation of a federal statute and there is no
constitutional provision to interpret? In Duro, the Supreme Court held that
Indian tribes did not possess inherent powers to prosecute nonmembers.84
But there is no constitutional provision that governs the scope of tribal in-
herent authority. So, the Court could not—and did not—point to a provi-
sion there in ruling on inherent tribal sovereignty. And Congress had never
expressly barred Indian tribes from prosecuting nonmembers, at least ac-
cording to the Court.85 So there was no statute to interpret either. In the
Duro fix, Congress said it was reaffirming inherent tribal authority.86 Con-
gress could have delegated federal power to prosecute, but that would pre-
vent the United States from prosecuting those who had already been prose-
cuted by the tribe. So Congress effectively told the Supreme Court either
that it simply disagreed with the Court’s understanding of tribal inherent
authority, or that Congress was correcting the federal government’s under-
standing of the scope of inherent tribal authority, which it can do as a func-
75. Id. at 197.
76. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990)).
77. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
78. Lara, 541 U.S. at 215–16.
79. Duro, 495 U.S. at 694.
80. Id. at 693–94 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (approving an Indian
tribe’s authority to enact laws that may be litigated criminally in federal court)).
81. Lara, 541 U.S. at 199 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-261, at 3–4 (1991)).
82. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 428 (2008) (“While Congress has ultimate authority
to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required, it may not supersede this
Court’s decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.” (internal citations omitted)).
83. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
84. Duro, 495 U.S. at 694.
85. Id. at 684.
86. H.R. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3–4 (1991).
11
Fletcher: On Indian Children
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON106.txt unknown Seq: 12 15-MAY-19 9:45
110 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 80
tion of federal plenary power in Indian affairs.87 The constitutional anomaly
was that no one knew whether the Duro decision was a non-reversible con-
stitutional decision.
Ultimately, the Court in Lara held that Congress was exercising its
plenary power over Indian affairs to alter the scope of inherent tribal pow-
ers.88 Another way to cast the line is to say that Congress was reaffirming
tribal powers that were always there, but indicating that the Supreme Court
incorrectly described those powers. However, the Court definitely con-
cluded that the Duro fix did not delegate federal powers to the tribes.89 The
United States’ merits brief framed the case to make clear the government’s
position was that the Duro fix either served as a reaffirmation of the tribal
inherent powers that authorized the tribe’s prosecution of Lara, or that the
initial tribal criminal conviction of Lara was invalid—all to protect the fed-
eral government’s subsequent conviction of Lara.90 This was a complicated
case.91
III. THE INDIAN FIFTH AMENDMENT
I propose that the judiciary adopt a method of interpreting the Fifth
Amendment in Indian affairs cases in light of the political origins of the
amendment, rather than the more modern individual rights and equal pro-
tection focus that the courts tend to give the amendment. Below I will ex-
plain why the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause92 has little or no relevance to Indian affairs. This is my
attempt to conclusively ground the political classification doctrine of Mor-
ton v. Mancari93 in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment was ratified in 1791,94 the year after the First
Congress began its Indian affairs journey in the Trade and Intercourse Act
87. Id.
88. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004).
89. Id. at 199.
90. Brief for the United States at *43–45, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107).
91. Justices Kennedy and Thomas each wrote separately to suggest that Indian tribes don’t have the
power to prosecute anyone because they are not really sovereigns. Lara, 541 U.S. at 211 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Of course, they were
still hamstrung by the reality that nothing in the Constitution affirmatively forbids tribal criminal law
enforcements powers. So, they both suggested in an alternative attack that Congress didn’t have the
power to authorize tribes to prosecute nonmembers, with Justice Thomas arguing the old saw that the
Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be rewritten from the start. Still, all of this begs the question of
the source of power in the Constitution to govern tribal powers. Greg Ablavsky’s commerce clause
paper effectively rebutted Justice Thomas’ theory of the commerce clause. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond
the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1019–20 (2015).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12
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of 179095 and two years after the ratification of the Constitution.96 There’s a
canon of statutory construction in American law that legal provisions
should be construed as a whole. The Fifth Amendment is a long, agrammat-
ical confluence of disparate legal principles entirely contained in a single
sentence. As far as I can tell, courts compartmentalize these principles all of
the time without reasoning why. Unlike the First Amendment,97 for exam-
ple, which has an overarching theory and tenor about protecting ideas from
governmental intrusion, or the Second Amendment’s militia provision,98
the Fifth Amendment, at first glance, looks like a random grab bag. It con-
tains an incredibly broad and vague principle of due process: an undefined
protection from the government that undergirds every action implicating
individuals’ rights to life, liberty, and property. That principle alone is
enough for an entire provision in the Bill of Rights,99 but no. Instead, the
Fifth Amendment starts with relatively specific protections relating to grand
juries, and then hits on self-incrimination and double jeopardy before it gets
to the general and nonspecific protections of the Due Process Clause. But
that’s not the end, because then, as almost an afterthought, the provision
adds a property takings and just compensation provision.100 The Fifth
Amendment doesn’t even limit itself to criminal versus civil rights.
There’s another canon of statutory construction that holds laws enacted
in close temporal proximity should be interpreted consistent with each
other.101 The 1790 Act102 is a fateful statute for legal historians obsessed
with the original public understanding of the Commerce Clause. The Act
barred anyone—American citizens, States, foreign nations and nationals—
from entering Indian country, trading with Indians, and buying Indian
lands.103 The Act imposed a criminal penalty on anyone who violated the
95. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
96. U.S. CONST. (1788) (the United States Constitution became the official governing document of
the United States on June 21, 1788, when New Hampshire became the ninth of thirteen States to ratify
it).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. Id. amend. II.
99. Id. amend. I–X.
100. James Madison’s original draft of what would become the Fifth Amendment includes all five of
these major clauses, though in slightly different order:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or
trial for the same offense; nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish
his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without just compensation.
Annals of Congress: Amendments to the Constitution: Debates Before the H.R., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 452
(1789).
101. Pullen v. Morgenthau, 73 F.2d 281, 283 (1934); see also SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 23:18 (Norman J. Singer ed., 7th ed. 2018).
102. AN ACT TO REGULATE TRADE AND INTERCOURSE WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES, 1 Stat. 137 §§1–7
(1790).
103. Id. § 4.
13
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prohibition.104 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence teaches us that Con-
gress’s authority to enact the 1790 Act derives primarily from the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power.105 The Court interpreted the 1790
Act in light of the Supremacy Clause,106 holding that the trade and inter-
course acts preempt state laws that conflict with federal Indian affairs stat-
utes.107
The temporal proximity of the Fifth Amendment to both the Indian
Commerce Clause and the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act requires courts
to understand and apply the original public understanding of the Fifth
Amendment as a whole, rather than a series of individual provisions. As a
whole, the Fifth Amendment is a bundle of political rights protecting
groups, not merely individuals. In fact, with the exception of the Lone Wolf
and Tee-Hit-Ton decisions, the Court’s application of the Fifth Amendment
as applied to Indian affairs legislation already tracks my proposed analysis.
The Wheeler Court acknowledged the sovereign characteristics of Indian
tribes expressly provided for in the Indian Commerce Clause.108 The Talton
Court held that tribal sovereign powers are not governed by the Fifth
Amendment.109 The Menominee Tribe Court implicitly acknowledged that
federal laws can vest or recognize Indian and tribal property interests that
are protected from federal takings by the Due Process and Just Compensa-
tion Clauses.110 The Mancari Court interpreted federal Indian affairs stat-
utes under the Fifth Amendment in light of the federal government’s duty
of protection to Indian tribes and individual Indians.111
Most, if not all, American legal commentators compartmentalize the
various provisions of the Fifth Amendment. We lawyers treat the principles
articulated in the Fifth Amendment as disparate and separate rights. We
even have a practice of capitalizing them as if they were separate mountains
in a range of legal rights—the Due Process Clause, the Double Jeopardy
104. Id. §§ 5–6.
105. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200–01 (2004).
106. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
107. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 531 (1832).
108. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324–28 (1978).
109. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896).
110. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 407–12, (1968) (Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, separately invoked this temporal canon when comparing the 1953 Public Law 280 with the
1954 Menominee Termination Act. The issue there was whether the 1954 Act terminated the tribe’s
treaty rights. The 1953 Act specifically referenced treaty rights—and preserved them generally—but the
1954 Act did not mention treaty rights at all. Justice Douglas concluded that since Congress was fully
aware of treaty rights in 1953, Congress was also aware of treaty rights in 1954. And, so, for the
Menominee Tribe Court, the 1954 Act’s silence could not support the abrogation of the tribe’s treaty
rights).
111. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974).
14
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Clause, the Takings and Just Compensation Clause, and so on. It’s not that
this is a mistake. But it’s not the only way to look at the Fifth Amendment.
At bottom, the Fifth Amendment originally was a series of political
statements that led to individual legal rights protections. The Founders were
preoccupied with three matters—keeping away the King of England; main-
taining, regulating, and perhaps later on banning slavery; and Indians.112
The English monarchy worried the American legal elite because it main-
tained the power (and sometimes exercised it) to confiscate private prop-
erty, summarily incarcerate political opponents, or do so without adequate
rights protections, and generally ruin the lives of Americans by fiat.113 Not
wishing to allow the new federal government to follow that same terrifying
path, the Framers of the Fifth Amendment—that is, James Madison and his
contemporaries—put together this list of political rights that really are indi-
vidual rights protections.114
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause seems to be inspired by
the worry of the abuse of governmental power for political purposes. The
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause that requires courts
to apply strict scrutiny whenever Congress or a federal actor creates racial
classifications115 did not come into play until well after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment.116 This is when the principle of equal protec-
tion entered the American polity. It wasn’t until Bolling v. Sharpe,117 de-
cided in 1954, that the Court held the Fifth Amendment also included an
equal protection requirement imposed on the federal government.118
In the context of Indian affairs legislation, the Fifth Amendment
should be analyzed in light of these concerns about the abuse of federal
political power. This is not the place to go into a survey of the abuses of
political power by the United States in relation to Indian tribes and individ-
ual Indians, but the historical context of the cases arising from the Fifth
Amendment described in this paper offer an adequate survey. The Talton
Court impliedly acknowledged that Indian tribes and individual Indians
were never invited to the constitutional polity, were not allowed to partici-
pate in the Constitutional Convention, and were not allowed to consider
112. See No author, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J.
1403 (1982); Jeff Broadwater, George Mason, James Madison, and the Evolution of the Bill of Rights,
15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 547 (2017).
113. See Broadwater, supra note 112. R
114. See id.
115. Order Partially Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at *12, Brackeen v. Zinke,
2018 WL 4927908 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018) (No. 4:17-CV-00868-O).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified July 28, 1868).
117. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
118. Id. at 500.
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ratifying the Constitution.119 So, to apply the Fifth Amendment to tribal
government actions was politically improper, in addition to legally wrong.
The Menominee Tribe case arose from the political act by a terminationist-
era Congress that wished to eliminate its Indian affairs programs120—argua-
bly an abuse of power that the Supreme Court (and the Department of Jus-
tice) at least impliedly blocked in the context of treaty rights. The Mancari
case is the most specifically political of all these cases in that it involved an
Act of Congress designed to limit, but sadly not eradicate, the political
abuses that federal bureaucrats had perpetrated on Indian people since the
establishment of the Office of Indian Affairs in the early nineteenth cen-
tury.121 In the Indian affairs context, the Fifth Amendment should be inter-
preted in light of its original political focus.
Some might argue that the political cast to the Fifth Amendment
should take a back seat to the Reconstruction Amendments,122 particularly
the Equal Protection Clause, and that the Fifth Amendment’s equal protec-
tion component must take precedent over the political rights. In the context
of Indian affairs, this could leave all of Title 25123 subject to strict scrutiny
as a series of racially based statutes. To those critics, I point to Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Indians Not Taxed Clause, which expressly
leaves Indian people out of this legal regime.124 The current equal protec-
tion focus of the Fifth Amendment derives from the sea change in Ameri-
can law brought on by the Reconstruction Amendments, but that sea change
was never extended to Indians and tribes in the actual text of the Constitu-
tion. In short, it is more than likely that the political protections afforded
Indian people and Indian tribes in the Fifth Amendment are actually far
more important than the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
There is also the canon of construction that requires courts to interpret
written laws relating to Indian affairs in a manner that respects the federal
government’s duty of protection to Indian tribes and Indian people.125 The
rules of interpreting Indian treaties require courts to take the history of
treaty negotiations into context, usually noting that the treaties were exe-
cuted in the English language, not in the language of the Indian people; that
the treaties were often dictated to Indian tribes without them having much
119. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
120. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 407 (1968); see also Kristy Gover, Geneal-
ogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in Membership Govern-
ance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243 (2009).
121. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1974).
122. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV.
123. Indians, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1–5506.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
125. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832).
16
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say about the content of the treaties given the unequal bargaining power
present in many (but not all) treaty negotiations; and the lengthy and deep
history of bad faith on behalf of the American treaty negotiators and the
United States in general.126 Courts are required to interpret treaty provisions
as the Indians understood them at the time.127 Courts are required to inter-
pret ambiguous treaty terms to the benefit of the Indians and Indian
tribes.128 Courts are required to allow parol evidence about the historical
context of the treaty negotiations and interpretations both before and after
the treaty execution.129 Rights guaranteed by treaty are not abrogated or
modified unless an act of Congress makes express Congress’ intention to do
so.130 Similarly, courts are required to interpret federal Indian affairs stat-
utes to the benefit of the Indians and Indian tribes.131
In sum, the Fifth Amendment’s political origins remain incredibly
meaningful in Indian affairs. The Fifth Amendment, like much of the Con-
stitution, shifted in character away from its political origins initially follow-
ing the Reconstruction Amendments, and then again after the mid-twentieth
century civil rights era. But in the text of the amended Constitution, Indians
and Indian tribes were not immediately and automatically included in that
shift. In particular, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment remains
primarily a political protection provision, rather than an equal protection or
an individual protection provision. For Indians and Indian tribes, the Fifth
Amendment remains political.
IV. APPLYING THE INDIAN FIFTH AMENDMENT
Imagine an Indian child, eligible for enrollment with the fictional Lake
Matchimanitou Band of Anishinaabe Indians, who has been removed by
state child protection service officials from their home in Traverse City,
Grand Traverse County, Michigan. The Indian child’s mom and dad are
also tribal citizens, but they have fallen on difficult economic times. State
officials receive a report about a “dirty home,” as some practitioners call
this type of case, and use the report as justification to take the Indian child
out of public school in Traverse City in the middle of the school day. The
state workers know of a non-Indian family interested in becoming foster
parents with an eye toward adoption and place the Indian child with this
family. The foster family lives in Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan,
126. See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02(1) (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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about 140 miles away. The tribe intervenes but the state court rejects the
tribe’s motion to transfer the case to tribal court under the Indian Child
Welfare Act or place the child in accordance with the Act’s placement pref-
erences. State workers, rejecting the tribe’s workers’ recommendations, im-
pose culturally inappropriate obligations on the parents, including a man-
date they attend self-help meetings rooted in Catholic philosophy; this, de-
spite both parents having been abused at Holy Childhood boarding school
as children. The parents have no success in meeting the state officials’ re-
quirements for reunification of the family. They have trouble traveling the
140 miles to visit their child. Those visits don’t go well anyway because the
foster parents are doing whatever they can to undermine them. Meanwhile,
the non-Indian foster parents begin the transition to adoptive parents. As the
state’s Title IV-E132 funds will expire in about a year, the state court termi-
nates the parental rights of the Indian parents. Shortly thereafter, the same
state court confirms the adoption of the Indian child by the foster parents.
This Indian child grows up in a non-Indian family, far from the service
area of the Lake Matchimanitou Band. Because the child lives away, they
are not eligible for tribal health services, tribal gaming per capita payments,
public housing, land assignment, higher education scholarships, and other
governmental services provided to tribal citizens and their children residing
within the tribe’s service area.
On appeal, the parents and the Lake Matchimanitou Band argue that
the state court failed to comply with several provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act on numerous occasions. The adoptive parents respond with a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Act rooted in the Order Partially
Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Brackeen v. Zinke.133
That court applied the strict scrutiny test derived from the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment to the Indian Child Welfare Act and
held key portions of it facially unconstitutional.134 The court reasoned that a
facial attack on the Act was justified, because the Act establishes a legal
classification of “Indian child” that includes both tribal citizens and those
merely eligible for membership.135
Under my characterization of the Fifth Amendment, the Indian Fifth
Amendment, the application of strict scrutiny to a federal law designed to
regulate the removal of Indian children from Indian custodians is com-
pletely wrong. The Indian Fifth Amendment prioritizes the political rights
of Indians and Indian tribes. Indian children who are tribal members are
132. 42 U.S.C. § 679(c) (2009).
133. Order Partially Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Brackeen v. Zinke, 2018
WL 4927908 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018) (No. 4:17-CV-00868-O).
134. Id. at *12–14.
135. Id. at *12.
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tribal members for political reasons. Recall my family’s decision to enroll
our children in one tribe over another, or even to enroll our children at all.
Those decisions are inherently political, as are the tribes’ decisions to allow
us to enroll. Similarly, Indian children who are eligible for membership are
in that political gray area in which perhaps the parents and custodians, or
the tribe or tribes, have yet to make that political decision on enrollment.
Secondly, the Indian Fifth Amendment—and even the mainstream
Fifth Amendment—should require the courts and the state actors to con-
sider the property rights implications of the removal of Indian children from
Indian custodians, and the physical removal of (or the prevention of the
return of) Indian children from the tribal homelands. Indian children have a
legal entitlement to federal government services that are administered by
tribes or federal agencies on or near Indian country.136 Indian children often
have a legal entitlement to share in governmental economic development
enterprises, sometimes in the form of direct per capita payments or minors’
trust accounts.137 Removal by states jeopardizes those entitlements.
Finally, recall that the Indian Child Welfare Act is rooted in the politi-
cal decision-making of governmental actors throughout the nation to re-
move Indian children as a means of “saving” them from their Indianness.
ICWA was an attempt to put a stop to that state-sanctioned political act of
gutting Indian tribes by taking their children. The current attacks on ICWA
are similarly politicized. There is no bipartisan effort to attack ICWA. In
fact, eight states (a majority of which were red states in the last presidential
election) have codified versions of the Indian Child Welfare Act,138 and
others may soon follow. The vanguard of the opposition is the Goldwater
Institute, an openly right-wing organization, and the deep-red states of
Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana.139 The opposition’s quieter ally is the pri-
vate adoption industry, which supports these attacks on ICWA in order to
manage and protect a $16 billion and growing market in private adop-
tion.140 This isn’t about benefitting Indian children at all. The apolitical
organizations dedicated to the enhancement of child welfare, Indian and
136. 25 U.S.C. § 1931.
137. E.g., Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, Pokagon Minors Trust (n.d.), available at http://
www.pokagon.com/sites/default/files/assets//minors-trust-information-389-196.pdf (last visited May 10,
2019).
138. Indigenous Law and Policy Center Blog, Michigan State University, College of Law, ICWA
Appellate Project, TURTLETALK.WORDPRESS.COM, https://perma.cc/77PA-SUVF (last visited Dec. 19,
2018).
139. Rebecca Clarren, A Right-Wing Think Tank Is Trying to Bring Down the Indian Child Welfare
Act. Why?, THENATION.COM, April 24–May 1, 2017, https://perma.cc/G8UX-STFV.
140. IBISWorld, Adoption & Child Welfare Services Industry in the US, IBISWORLD.COM, March
2018, https://perma.cc/QUF6-UR3N.
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non-Indian alike, on the other hand, strongly support the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act.141
It was then, and remains now, primarily political acts that remove In-
dian children from their Indian families and tribes. Yes, these political acts
are rooted in racism, but the solution, which includes the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act, is political, just like every other Indian affairs law. If there is a
right time to rethink the Fifth Amendment and recast its application in the
Indian affairs context, it is now.
V. THE TALE OF AN ANISHINAABE MOTHER
One of my favorite Anishinaabe sacred stories—the old Indians called
a sacred story aadizookaan—is the story of the Anishinaabe mother and
Toad Woman. There was an Anishinaabe family that lived a little bit apart
from the village, at the edge of the woods, just far enough so as to be easy
pickings for someone bad like Toad Woman. The family consisted of two
young parents and an infant child. One day, Toad Woman snuck into the
lodge and took the infant child, stole him from right under their noses,
cradleboard and all. The young parents were devastated and quickly, and
sadly, turned to blaming each other for being negligent parents. They
looked and looked for their child, but being so close to the dense forest,
they could not find him. The father gave up after a time and left his wife.
But the mother never stopped looking. She never gave up in her quest to
find her child. She delved deeper and deeper into the woods. Much time
passed.
Eventually, the mother came across Toad Woman’s lodge. It was im-
maculate. The coverings were brand new deer hides and birch bark. There
was what seemed to be an entire trader’s lodge full of dried meat and fish
all over. There was a bountiful store of dried berries and corn. Toad Woman
was blessed. The Anishinaabe mother approached the lodge and called out.
Toad Woman knew exactly who this woman was and responded coldly,
“There’s nothing for you here.”
The mother knew of Toad Woman. She recalled that Toad Woman had
been cast out from the main village many years earlier, but they had never
met. “Oh, I want nothing,” the mother responded gently. “I admit I am
impressed by your bounty. How do you manage it?”
Toad Woman proudly boasted, “My son is a tireless and gifted hunter
and fisher. He logs birch trees for the lodge. He helps me gather berries and
corn. He loves his mother.” Toad Woman beamed.
“You must be so proud,” the mother said.
141. Brief of Casey Family Programs, et al. at *5, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 537 U.S. 637
(2013), 2013 WL 1279468 (No. 12-399).
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Just then, a young Anishinaabe man appeared at the lodge, coming out
of the woods. He was carrying an impossible load of deer meat and fresh
fish. The mother gasped—and Toad Woman noticed. This young man
looked like the spitting image of the mother’s husband, the one who had left
her out of despair. The mother immediately guessed she had found her
child.
The rest of the story is about the competitive game the mother and
Toad Woman played for a long time that eventually led the young man to
realize he had been kidnapped by Toad Woman, and fraudulently raised as
Toad Woman’s son. That part is interesting but not the point of the story I
want to highlight here.
I want to highlight that Indian people, especially Indian women, have
been fighting for their children for centuries. They don’t stop, no matter
how much pain they suffer, no matter how long it takes. They never give
up.
I am reminded of the night ten days after Owen was born in 2006. We
were living in Grand Forks, North Dakota when Wenona gave birth, but we
planned to relocate to Michigan as soon as Owen and his mother were ready
to travel. We rented a large, fancy, brand new SUV to drive from Grand
Forks to East Lansing. On the first day of travel, that fancy SUV broke
down on the side of I-94 at the top of a massive highway interchange, in the
middle of the night, in the rain. We were stuck there for hours because the
rental company didn’t operate very quickly in the middle of the night. As a
new dad, I sat there nervous and sweating for those hours, imagining that
every vehicle coming up behind us would be the one to crash into the back
of our stalled vehicle and wipe Owen’s parents off the earth. We have a
strong family who would take care of Owen, but not every Indian family
has that. Some Indian kids are lost that way into a child welfare system that
follows funding sources like water running downstream. I’m still terrified
by that feeling of helplessness I felt for those hours.
Reading the Brackeen ruling made me think of that night. Owen was
less than two weeks old. There was no chance we could have enrolled him
in such a short time frame, especially since we were moving from North
Dakota to Michigan. If, for some impenetrable political reason, Minnesota
child welfare officials took Owen, placed him in emergency care, and ap-
plied that decision, our Indian families would have lost a critical legal tool
to bring him back. I find it unimaginable given the history of Indian remov-
als in our families that the Indian Child Welfare Act, at least as interpreted
by that federal judge in Texas, would not help. Indian people have come to
depend on ICWA, even when it doesn’t work as well as it could or should.
But it wasn’t so long ago that there was no Indian Child Welfare Act. I
think of Laura cleaning house and cooking for her family, carefully dusting
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the portraits of Jesus and placing Bibles around the house. I think of how
close the Stevens family must have come to losing everything. I think of
Wenona and Christina that day when the church took Christina and gave
her away to a white family, how close Wenona might have been to suffer-
ing that same fate. It’s such a thin line, the line that Indian people walk
between safety and disaster.
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